



HI-LITE

Integrating Formal Program Verification with Testing

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Workshop on Theorem Proving in
Certification
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Project Hi-Lite

Application to Nose Gear Velocity

Tool Qualification

Unit proofs vs. unit tests

unit tests are costly to develop and maintain

use instead unit proof:

1. express LLRs as function contracts
2. interpret code+contracts in Hoare logics
3. use Dijkstra's WP calculus to generate VCs
4. prove VCs with automatic prover

unit proof used industrially:

- ▶ SPARK toolset (SPARK code): data/information flows, run-time errors
- ▶ Frama-C platform (C code): contracts and run-time errors

DO-178C supports replacing unit tests with unit proofs

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How do we define contracts?

usual approach: first-order logic + program locations

- ▶ problem! avoid inconsistencies
solution? generation of models
- ▶ problem! detect incorrect contracts
solution? generation of counterexamples

our approach: pure Boolean expressions (no writes)

- ▶ avoid inconsistencies? forbid axioms
- ▶ detect incorrect contracts? test/execute
- ▶ possible effects? analyze and reject
- ▶ possible run-time errors? generate VCs and prove

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usual approach:

1. restrict language to potentially provable subset
2. use multiple automatic provers
3. write proof script in proof assistant
4. manually inspect and validate VC

our approach:

1. limit proof to potentially provable subset
2. generate VCs targetting selected prover
3. ensure possible combination with tested code
4. test remaining functions

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The three pillars of formal methods in DO-178C

Unambiguous formal semantics

match compiler choices of sizes & alignments for target
prevent compiler-dependent behavior:

- ▶ functions (not procedures) cannot have side-effects
- ▶ expressions cannot have side-effects
- ▶ arithmetic expressions are parenthesized if needed

Sound formal analysis

deductive verification à la Hoare

Justified assumptions for proofs

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formal verification of P assumes:

- ▶ precondition of P
- ▶ postcondition of subprograms called
- ▶ both user-defined and implicit ones

assumptions made for proof should be verified by testing

2 cases:

- ▶ tested T calls proved P
 - check precondition of P at run-time
- ▶ proved P calls tested T
 - check postcondition of T at run-time
- ▶ ...during test of T !

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Justified assumptions for proofs (cont'd)

1. identify implicit contracts (effects, strong typing, non-aliasing)
2. effects: generated (restrictions on complete program)
3. strong typing:
 - ▶ strongly typed language (Ada)
 - ▶ forbid unsafe language features (pointer conversion)
 - ▶ proof: generate VCs
 - ▶ test: compiler inserts checks
4. non-aliasing:
 - ▶ limit proof to subset with references (no pointers)
 - ▶ global static analysis for non-aliasing with globals
 - ▶ proof: semantic verification for parameter non-aliasing
 - ▶ test: compiler inserts checks for parameter non-aliasing

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Tool Qualification

Matching data to types

two different types of data:

- ▶ external counters with modulo semantics
- ▶ non-negative values for time/distance/velocity

coded in C example as `unsigned` causing 4 kinds of errors in code:

1. useless wraparound code
2. wrong wraparound: `65534 - (prevTime - thisTime)`
3. inconsistent pattern: `if (prevCount < thisCount)`
4. copy-paste error: `currTime` or `thisTime` for `t3`?

in Ada, modulo integer (semantics) \neq non-negative (constraint)

Dealing with dimensions and units

two dimensions: distance and time

three combinations: velocity, acceleration, jerk

many units: distance (cm, m, inch), time (ms, s), velocity (km/h)

vulnerability in code:

```
static init whcf = .. * 254) / 7) * 22) / 100;
```

equivalent to

```
static init whcf = .. * 254) * 22) / 7) / 100;
```

only up to WHEEL_DIAMETER = 51

errors in code:

1. wrong conversion: missing /100 for maxMsecs
2. wrong conversion: *500 should be *50 for maxClicks

Christof Grein's SI units library

```
1 package SI is new Constrained_Checked_SI (Float);
2 package U is new SI.Generic_Units;
3 use SI, U;
4
5 Pi      : constant           := 3.14;
6 Inch   : constant Distance := 2.14*centi*Meter;
7 WHEEL  : constant Distance := 26.0*Inch;
8 WHCF   : constant Distance := WHEEL * Pi;
9
10 PrevCount : Count := 0;
11 PrevTime  : Time  := 0.0*milli*Meter;

raised NG.SI.SI.UNIT_ERROR :
  unconstrained_checked_si.adb:72
  instantiated at constrained_checked_si.ads:204
  instantiated at ng.ads:9
```

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Compile-time dimensional analysis in GNAT

```
1 subtype Time is Natural with
2   Dimension (second => 1, others => 0);
3 subtype Distance is Natural with
4   Dimension (meter => 1, others => 0);
5 subtype Count is Natural;
6 subtype Velocity is Natural with
7   Dimension(meter => 1, second => -1, others=>0);
8
9 WHEEL : constant Distance := 26;  -- inches
10 WHCF  : constant Distance :=      -- cm
11       (((WHEEL * 254) / 7) * 22) / 100;
12
13 PrevCount : Count := 0;
14 PrevTime  : Time := 0;  -- ms
```


Defining execution conditions

update should not occur if no new click translated as precondition:

```
1 procedure ComputeNGVelocity
2   (CurrTime   : in    Mod_Time;
3    ThisTime   : in    Mod_Time;
4    ThisCount  : in    Mod_Count;
5    Success    :      out Boolean;
6    Result     :      out Velocity)
7 with
8   Pre => ThisTime /= PrevTime
9         and then ThisCount /= PrevCount;
```

explicit precondition avoids error in C example:

```
1 if (thisTime = prevTime) return;
2 ...
3 if (thisCount = prevCount) { ...
```

Checking absence of run-time errors

```
1  procedure ComputeNGVelocity (...) is
2      T1, T2 : Time;
3      D1, D2 : Distance;
4  begin
5      if ThisCount - PrevCount < ThisTime - PrevTime
6      then
7          Success := False;
8          return;
9      end if;
10
11     T1 := Time (ThisTime - PrevTime);
12     T2 := Time (CurrTime - ThisTime);
13     D1 := WHCF * Count (ThisCount - PrevCount);
14     D2 := (D1 * T2) / T1;
15
16     Success := True;
17     Result := ((D1 + D2) * 3600) / (T1 + T2);
18 end ComputeNGVelocity;
```

Formal verification for run-time errors

```
ng.adb:49:28: range check not proved
ng.adb:50:28: range check not proved
ng.adb:51:18: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:51:18: (info) range check proved
ng.adb:52:17: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:52:23: (info) division check proved
ng.adb:52:23: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:52:23: range check not proved
ng.adb:55:23: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:55:29: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:55:37: (info) division check proved
ng.adb:55:37: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:55:37: (info) range check proved
ng.adb:55:43: (info) overflow check proved
```

Formal contract

```
1 procedure ComputeNGVelocity (...)
2 with
3   Pre => ThisTime /= PrevTime
4       and then ThisCount /= PrevCount,
5   Post =>
6     (if Success then
7       Result = Velocity(
8         (((WHCF * Integer (ThisCount-PrevCount)) +
9          ((WHCF * Integer (ThisCount-PrevCount))
10           * Integer (CurrTime - ThisTime))
11           / Integer (ThisTime - PrevTime))
12          * 3600)
13         / Integer (CurrTime - PrevTime)));
```

change code from

```
1      D2 := (D1 * T2) / T1;
```

to erroneous

```
1      D2 := (D1 + T2) / T1;
```

leads to

```
raised SYSTEM.ASSERTIONS.ASSERT_FAILURE :  
  failed postcondition from ng.adb:33
```

```
ng.adb:24:15: postcondition not proved
ng.adb:27:27: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:27:62: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:28:29: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:29:22: (info) overflow check proved
ng.adb:30:22: (info) division check proved
ng.adb:30:22: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:31:19: overflow check not proved
ng.adb:32:19: (info) division check proved
ng.adb:32:19: overflow check not proved
```

Formal contract (cont'd)

```
1 procedure UpdateNGVelocity with
2   Post =>
3     (if EstimatedGroundVelocityIsAvailable then
4       EstimatedGroundVelocity =
5         (DistanceSinceLastClickBeforeLastUpdate
6          * 3600)
7         / TimeSinceLastClickBeforeLastUpdate);
8
9 function DistanceSince... return Distance is
10   (DistanceFromLastClickToLastUpdate
11    + DistanceSinceLastUpdate);
12
13 function DistanceFrom... return Distance is
14   (WHCF * (ThisCount - PrevCount));
```

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Tool Qualification

Appropriate TQL for DO-178C

1. used for requirement based verification (replaces unit testing)
⇒ TQL-5
2. used for robustness verification (replaces robustness tests)
⇒ TQL-5
3. used for both
⇒ TQL-4 (levels 1 and 2) or TQL-5
4. TQL-4 & TQL-5: Tool Operational Requirements are defined
5. TQL-4: TORs are complete, accurate and consistent
6. TQL-4: tool requirements are developed and verified

Objective B: tools are qualified

- ▶ formalism: first-order Hoare logics + run-time checks
- ▶ software tools: compiler + translator + VCgen + prover
- ▶ assumptions: user-defined contracts + implicit contracts
- ▶ all the chain is FLOSS \Rightarrow facilitates duplication
- ▶ soundness argument for each piece
- ▶ prover removed from qualification if produces checkable trace
- ▶ super qualification: formally proved correct (VCgen, prover)

Objective C: software requirements

1. complete
 - ▶ divide contract in cases (behaviors in JML)
 - ▶ contract cases cover the precondition
2. consistent
 - ▶ contract cases are disjoint
 - ▶ consistency can be expressed and checked:
$$\forall inputs \in Pre. \exists outputs \in Post. Pre \Rightarrow Post$$
3. unambiguous
 - ▶ expression as Boolean predicates
4. verifiable
 - ▶ by testing or formal verification

Objective K: source code vs. software requirements

1. compliance
 - ▶ contract-based verification (testing or proving)
2. traceability
 - ▶ by nature, contracts are attached to function

<http://www.open-do.org/projects/hi-lite/>